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We evaluate utilitarian judgments under the dual-system approach of the mind. In the study, 
participants respond to a cognitive reflection test and five (sacrificial and greater good) dilemmas 
that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. There is judgment reversal across 
the dilemmas, a result that casts doubt in considering utilitarianism as a stable, ethical standard to 
evaluate the quality of moral judgments. In all the dilemmas, participants find the utilitarian 
judgment too demanding in terms of cognitive currency because it requires non-automatic, 
deliberative thinking. In turn, their moral intuitions related to the automatic mind are frame 
dependent, and thus can be either utilitarian or non-utilitarian. This suggests automatic moral 
judgments are about descriptions, not about substance. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
 The ethical theory of utilitarianism [1, 2] is summarized in Bentham’s aphorism that “the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number is the basis of morals and legislation.” However simple 
it may appear to maximize the welfare of the group, this proposition allows for more than one 
interpretation. These will be discussed later. The major alternatives to utilitarian ethics are the 
Kantian deontological and the Aristotelian virtue-based ones. However, many favor the utilitarian 
perspective as the ethical yardstick against which the quality of people’s moral judgment should 
be evaluated [3-5]. 
 Current moral psychology is inclined to the type of interpretation called act utilitarianism 
[6-8]. However, there is also a rule utilitarianism [9]. Killing one person to save five may be 
justified under the act utilitarianism, but not under the rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism thus 
assesses utilitarian judgments through “sacrificial moral dilemmas,” such as that of a runaway 
trolley that hurtles toward five unaware workers. The only way to save them is to push a heavy 
man, standing nearby on a footbridge, onto the track, where he will die stopping the trolley [10]. 
Facing such a dilemma, most people make the non-utilitarian choice. Worse, those who adopt the 
utilitarian judgment paradoxically exhibit antisocial characteristics that are at odds with the very 
social content of the utilitarian ethics [11]. For this reason, that way of representing utilitarianism 
has been criticized and “greater good” dilemmas have been proposed instead as a “genuine” 
utilitarian approach [12]. 
 Automatic and deliberative cognitive processes should mediate moral judgments [13]. 
Most cognitive psychologists currently favor a dual-system approach [14] in which two systems 
compete for control of our inferences, actions and judgments. Intuitive decisions require little 
reflection and use “System 1.” By scanning associative memory, we usually base our actions on 
experiences that worked well in the past. However, whenever we make decisions by constructing 
mental models or simulations of future possibilities, we engage “System 2.” Individuals differ in 
their cognitive abilities, but a simple test can assess their differences. The cognitive reflection test 
(CRT) [15] gauges the relative powers of Systems 1 and 2: the individual ability to think quickly 
with little conscious deliberation (using System 1) and to think in a slower and more reflective 
way (using System 2). High scores on the CRT track how strong System 2 is for one individual. 
 Here, we evaluate utilitarian judgments under the dual-system approach in a study where 
participants respond to a CRT and to sacrificial and greater good dilemmas that pit utilitarian and 
non-utilitarian options against each other. 
  The next section describes the experiment details. Section 3 presents results and discusses 
them, and Section 4 concludes this report. 
 
2. Materials and methods 
 
The experimenter (MDS) sent Google Docs questionnaires to students from four large 
Brazilian universities: University of Brasilia, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Federal 
University of Rio Grande do Sul and Federal Institute of Minas Gerais. The students were enrolled 
in several disciplines, ranging from physics, chemistry, civil engineering, computer science, 
statistics, business administration, accounting, economics, physiotherapy, nutrition, design and 
pedagogy. The questionnaires were administrated to the students by their own teachers using 
university intranet pages. The questionnaires were also sent to participants not related to the 
universities. A total of 468 individuals participated (235 males, 233 females; age: mean = 24.21, 
standard deviation = 4.81). The participants were 393 university students and 75 young adults 
unaffiliated with the universities. All participants were instructed to respond to the CRT in Table 
1 and to the utilitarian moral dilemmas displayed in Table 2. Two types of questionnaire were 
presented. In the type 1 questionnaires (204 respondents), the CRT came first, whereas in the type 
2 questionnaires (264 respondents), the moral dilemmas came first. 
The three simple questions of the CRT were originally designed to elicit automatic 
responses that are wrong [15]. The questionnaires instructed the participants to respond to the three 
questions in Table 1 in less than 30 seconds; this was to ensure an automatic choice. The correct 
answers in Table 1 are 5, 5 and 47. However, the most common, intuitive answers are 10, 100 and 
24. The intuitive answer that springs quickly to mind in question 1 is “10 cents.” This is wrong 
because if x  is the ball cost, then (1.00 ) 1.10 0.05x x x     . The automatic answer to 
question 2 is 100. To see why this is wrong, take the first sentence and multiply 5 machines by 20; 
thus, it would take the same 5 minutes to make 100 widgets. The intuitive answer in question 3 is 
24, but if exponential 
nd  represents the function where n  is the number of days it takes the patch 
to cover the entire lake, thus, half is always 1n . Then, the patch will cover half the lake in 
48 1 47   days. The three questions on the CRT are easy because their solutions are easily 
understood when explained [15]. However, reaching one correct answer requires the suppression 
of an erroneous answer that impulsively comes to mind. 
 
Table 1. Cognitive reflection test 





1 A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? 
5 cents 10 cents 
2 If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? 
5 minutes 100 minutes 
3 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take the 
patch to cover half the lake? 
47 days 24 days 
Source: Ref. [15] 
 
At the end of the questionnaires, participants were asked whether they had really spent less 
than 30 seconds to answer to the CRT. There was also a question inquiring as to whether they 
already knew any of the three questions. We removed from the sample those who declared to have 
taken more than 30 seconds or to have known at least one of the questions. As a result, the sample 
was reduced to 398 participants (type 1 questionnaire: N = 173; type 2 questionnaire: N = 225). 
The utilitarian moral dilemmas in Table 2 were selected to purposely contrast 
circumstantial or parochial dilemmas with humanity dilemmas. Personal dilemmas are associated 
with egocentric attitudes and no identification with the whole of humanity [12]. “Greater good” 
dilemmas consider the latter. 
The benchmark sacrificial dilemma is that of the trolley (Table 2). We consider both the 
personal [10] and impersonal [16] versions because this distinction matters [17]. A further 
justification for administering two types of questionnaire is precisely to consider this difference. 
Type 1 questionnaires involve the personal sacrificial dilemma [10], and type 2 questionnaires spot 
the impersonal sacrificial dilemma [16]. In the personal version, the trolley hurtles toward five 
unaware workers and the only way to save them is to push a heavy man, standing nearby on a 
footbridge, onto the track. In the impersonal version, throwing a switch diverts the trolley onto 
another track, killing one worker. In terms of simple utilitarian arithmetic, this sacrificial dilemma 
is still utilitarian (but see [12]). After all, one should consider the “greater good” of killing just one 
man rather than killing five. Although the logic of choice in both personal and impersonal versions 
is the same, its architecture changes. And this fact usually causes preference reversals on this moral 
judgment. Indeed, most people choose the utilitarian action in the impersonal version and the non-
utilitarian one in the personal version [18]. The next section will show this finding is replicated in 
our own questionnaires. Moreover, we will provide an explanation for such moral preference 
reversals based on the model of two minds. 
 
Table 2. Utilitarian moral dilemmas 








Trolley problem: Footbridge. In the path of a runaway train car are five railway 
workers who will surely be killed unless you, a bystander, do something. You are 
standing on a pedestrian walkway that arches over the tracks next to a large 
stranger. Your body would be too light to stop the train, but if you push the 
stranger onto the tracks, killing him, his large body will stop the train. 









Trolley problem: Bystander. In the path of a runaway train car are five railway 
workers who will surely be killed unless you, a bystander, do something. If you 
flip a switch, the train will be diverted onto another track, where it will kill a 
single railway worker. 
In this situation, would you flip the switch? 
D2 Personal self-benefit 
dilemma 
[17] 
Preventing Ebola. You are a Peace Corps health-worker who is volunteering in a 
rural African village. A prominent man from a nearby village has contracted the 
Ebola virus that is extremely contagious, incurable, and almost always fatal 
within a week. Miraculously, this man has survived for a month, and so he must 
be a rare carrier who is immune to the virus’ deadly effects. However, this man 
wrongly believes that your health center can cure his disease. You see him 
approaching and you know that if he enters the village he will spread the virus to 
hundreds of innocent people who, unlike him, will die. There is a loaded gun in 
the health center. You realize that the only way you can prevent him from entering 
the village and spreading the virus to you and the rest of the village is to shoot 
and kill him as he approaches. 
Should you kill the man in order to save yourself and the rest of the village? 
D3 Greater good 
dilemma 
[12] 
Firefighter. Albert is a firefighter who is trying to rescue people from a burning 
building. The building is about to collapse and, in the time left, Albert will only 
be able to rescue one more person. In the room he has entered, Albert finds two 
trapped people that he immediately recognizes. One is a famous peace negotiator 
well known for his work resolving armed conflicts around the world and who is 
likely to continue doing this important work if he survives. The other is a poor, 
uneducated housekeeper. The housekeeper is Albert’s mother. Albert has to 
decide which of these to save, and the one he does not save will die. 
Should Alberto save the peace negotiator rather than his mother? 
D4 Greater good 
dilemma 
[12] 
One vs. many donation. Mark is a U.S. businessman who would like to give 
$1,000 to charity, and is deciding between two charities. The first focuses on 
preventing disease in the U.S., and Mark’s donation would save the life of one 
child. The second focuses on preventing disease in a distant foreign country Mark 
has never been to, and his donation would save the lives of several children. Mark 
has already made up his mind to donate to one of the two charities, and just needs 
to decide to which one. 
Should Mark donate to the charity in the foreign country? 
D5 Greater good 
dilemma 
[12] 
Benjamin’s car or donation. Benjamin is a college student who has always 
wanted to have his own car. He works after school jobs, saves all of his money, 
and rarely goes out, until finally he has $7,000. On his way to the used car 
dealership, he reads about a tsunami in Southeast Asia that has left thousands 
dead, wounded, and homeless. A number is given where donations can be 
processed to help these victims. Benjamin knows that if he were to donate a 
significant amount to this charity, his donation would make a real difference to 
the lives of several of the victims of the tsunami. 
Should Benjamin donate any of the money rather than buy the car? 
 
The previous sacrificial dilemmas in which one is asked whether to sacrifice a single 
individual to save a group of strangers is referred to as “other-benefit dilemmas.” In contrast, 
whenever the sacrifice also benefits the participant, he or she faces a “self-benefit dilemma” [17]. 
Dilemma D2 is of the self-benefit variety (Table 2). It is equally criticized on the basis that it is 
not genuinely utilitarian, because it lacks the identification with the whole of humanity [12]. 
However, this standpoint has not reached a consensus in literature, partially because it is too new. 
We then decided to include the self-benefit dilemma D2 in the questionnaires for the same reason 
we included the other-benefit dilemmas D1. This will prove the right thing to do because our 
results will apply to utilitarian dilemmas of all types. In a broader sense, D2 is still utilitarian 
because it considers an arithmetic that pits the options of having less- or more-harmed individuals 
against each other. In particular, D2 is more akin to the D1 of type 1 questionnaires, in that D2 is 
personal. 
In the three greater good dilemmas in Table 2, participants are left a choice to identify 
themselves with humanity as a whole. This contrasts with either a parochial attachment to one’s 
own community or country [12], or a focus on one’s particular circumstance. It is argued that such 
all-encompassing, impartial concern is a core feature of classical utilitarianism [19]. 
For each dilemma D1-D5, participants were also asked to rate their perceived wrongness 
of not adopting the utilitarian action (“a little wrong” = 1 to “very wrong” = 5) [12]. This question 
thus asks for a conscious, deliberate response that engages System 2. 
 
3. Results and discussion 
 
Figure 1 shows the results regarding CRT performance. The marked difference between 
the two types of questionnaire occurs for the performance of those who does not score at all on the 
test. In type 2 questionnaires, where the CRT is posted after the moral dilemmas, participants who 
scored none of the questions were reduced by nearly 8 percent. This result is statistically 
significant. A one-sided, two-sample bootstrap t-test with 10,000 replicates shows a p-value less 
than 0.03, and thus we conclude the two distributions are not identical. We explain this improved 
performance by the fact that in type 2 questionnaires, participants became more cognitively alert 
as a consequence of previously answering the questions related to the moral dilemmas. 
 
 
Figure 1. CRT performance. Left: type 1 questionnaires; right: type 2 questionnaires. Those answering type 2 
questionnaires became more cognitively alert after deciding on the moral dilemmas, and thus improved the 
performance on the CRT. 
  Indeed, Table 3 shows the average CRT performance for type 2 questionnaires was higher 
(1.06) than that for type 1 questionnaires (0.85) (p-value < 0.03). University students scored higher 
than non-students did on both types of questionnaire (statistically significant for type 2 
questionnaires). Moreover, in both types of questionnaire, those answering within 30 seconds 
scored higher on the CRT than those answering in more than 30 seconds, but the difference in 
performance between the two groups was not statistically significant. Those who provided non-
utilitarian answers considering the five dilemmas scored higher on the CRT, but this result is to be 
taken with caution because the dilemmas are not cognitively similar. For example, in D1 and D5 
non-utilitarians beat utilitarians on CRT performance in both types of questionnaire, but the 
reverse is true considering dilemmas D2, D3 and D4 (Figure 2). 
 
Table 3. Average CRT and type of questionnaire 
Average CRT Type 1 questionnaires Type 2 questionnaires p-value* 
general 0.85 1.06 0.026 
for university students 0.88 1.15 0.012 
for non-students 0.70 0.66 0.575 
difference between the two groups: p-value 0.234 0.004 - 
for those answering within 30 seconds 0.95 1.12 0.148 
for those answering in more than 30 seconds 0.78 1.00 0.055 
difference between the two groups: p-value 0.151 0.199 - 
for utilitarian answers considering dilemma D1 0.40 0.98 0.009 
                                                                       D2 0.91 1.16 0.058 
                                                                       D3 0.88 1.08 0.286 
                                                                       D4 0.85 1.06 0.036 
                                                                       D5 0.68 0.97 0.117 
for non-utilitarian answers considering dilemma D1 0.89 1.27 0.009 
                                                                              D2 0.81 0.90 0.261 
                                                                              D3 0.85 1.06 0.032 
                                                                              D4 0.81 1.05 0.258 
                                                                              D5 0.91 1.07 0.092 
* p-values from one-sided, two-sample bootstrap t-test with 10,000 replicates 
 
 
Figure 2. Average CRT for utilitarian (blue) and non-utilitarian (red) answers given to the five moral dilemmas. Left: 
type 1 questionnaires; right: type 2 questionnaires. The different dilemmas are not cognitively similar in that in D1 
and D5 non-utilitarians beat utilitarians on CRT performance, but the reverse is true considering dilemmas D2, D3 
and D4. This occurs for both types of questionnaire (Table 4). 
 
 Figure 3 displays the utilitarian and non-utilitarian answers considering the five dilemmas. 
As for the sacrificial dilemma D1, in its personal version (type 1 questionnaires) most respondents 
made the non-utilitarian choice. There was reversal in the impersonal version of D1 (type 2 
questionnaires): most respondents now favored the utilitarian choice. In other words, most 
respondents were non-utilitarians when the dilemma was framed as pushing a person, but they 
reverted their judgment and became utilitarians when the dilemma was presented as moving an 
object. The p-values in Table 3 show this result is statistically significant for both types of 
questionnaires. This result is in line with the previous literature [18]. 
 
 
Figure 3. Utilitarian (blue) and non-utilitarian (red) answers given to the five moral dilemmas changed across the 
dilemmas. 
 
 In both types of questionnaire, respondents found it more wrong not to make the utilitarian 
choice in dilemma D1 (Figure 4). When they deliberately think (using System 2), they are capable 
of making the utilitarian arithmetic. This does not mean, however, participants are automatic non-
utilitarians in dilemma D1 because the default, automatic decision using System 1 is frame 
dependent. And, this is compatible with the view that people do not carry any predetermined moral 
preferences. Indeed, a result from the literature of framing effects is that “there is no underlying 
preference that is masked or distorted by a frame. Our preferences are about framed problems, and 
our moral intuitions are about descriptions, not about substance” [20]. Moreover, we found no 
correlation between perceived wrongness and CRT (available upon request), which means 
perceived wrongness carries independent information not already conveyed in the CRT. 
 
 
Figure 4. Average perceived wrongness of not adopting the utilitarian action for utilitarian (blue) and non-utilitarian 
(red) answers given to the five moral dilemmas. Left: type 1 questionnaires; right: type 2 questionnaires. 
 
 There was also judgment reversal in the self-benefit dilemma D2 across the two types of 
questionnaire. In type 1 questionnaires, most respondents adopted the non-utilitarian choice, and 
in type 2 questionnaires, most respondents were utilitarians (which meant killing a man to save 
oneself and the others). However, the p-values in Table 3 show this result is statistically significant 
for type 1 questionnaires only. This judgment reversal may be related to the architecture of choice 
participants faced. In type 1 questionnaires, the CRT was answered prior to the moral dilemmas. 
We speculate that that may have generated “ego depletion” [21], in which case System 1 takes 
control. Killing a man is bad, and for System 1 “What You See Is All There Is” [20]. Performing 
the utilitarian arithmetic (killing one to save oneself and the others) is cognitively demanding. In 
type 2 questionnaires, there was no possibility of ego depletion because the CRT was posted at the 
end. This may have freed up System 2 to perform the utilitarian arithmetic and explain why most 
respondents adopted the utilitarian judgment. Interestingly, in both types of questionnaire, 
respondents found it more wrong not to make the utilitarian choice of killing a man. Here, the 
utilitarian choice is difficult and requires the use of System 2. However, as in the previous 
dilemmas D1, the automatic choice was also frame dependent in dilemma D2. 
 As for the great good dilemmas D3, D4 and D5, the type of questionnaire did not matter 
for the judgments made by the participants. However, most respondents were non-utilitarians in 
D3 and D5, and adopted a utilitarian judgment in D4. There was judgment reversal even across 
the three greater good dilemmas. This may be related to the roles System 1 and System 2 played 
in each. 
 In dilemma D3, only 14 percent (in type 1 questionnaires) and 6 percent (in type 2 
questionnaires) made the utilitarian choice (Table 4). Most respondents were not prepared to save 
the peace negotiator rather than Alberto’s mother. They did not identify themselves with humanity 
as a whole, and preferred to make a judgment based on genetic ties. This strongly suggests the 
involvement of System 1 in mediating the non-utilitarian answers. Most respondents preferred 
saving the mother despite perceiving the action of not saving the pacifier as more wrong (Figure 
4). This shows a conflict between the two minds in the judgment making of dilemma D3. Being 
utilitarian is this dilemma D3 was highly costly in terms of cognitive currency. Incidentally, those 
giving the utilitarian answer scored slightly higher on the CRT than non-utilitarians did (Table 4), 
but the differences between the groups was not statistically significant. 
  
Table 4. Answers given to the five utilitarian moral dilemmas 
 Type 1 questionnaire 
 
Type 2 questionnaire 
Utilitarian moral dilemma D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
Utilitarian answers 9% 40% 14% 91% 27% 73% 60% 6% 84% 13% 
Non-utilitarian answers 91% 60% 86% 9% 73% 27% 40% 95% 17% 87% 
Average CRT for utilitarians 0.40 0.91 0.88 0.85 0.68 0.98 1.16 1.08 1.06 0.97 
Average CRT for non-utilitarians 0.89 0.81 0.85 0.81 0.91 1.27 0.89 1.05 1.05 1.07 
Average CRT difference between the two 
groups: p-value* 
0.03 0.26 0.43 0.47 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.46 0.49 0.31 
Average perceived wrongness of not adopting 
the utilitarian action (utilitarians) 
3.47 2.45 2.33 2.11 2.28 3.07 2.86 3.31 2.82 2.83 
Average perceived wrongness of not adopting 
the utilitarian action (non-utilitarians) 
1.91 1.77 1.99 1.31 1.95 2.22 2.82 2.82 2.97 2.84 
Average perceived wrongness difference 
between the two groups: p-value* 
0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.09  0.00 0.41 0.03 0.25 0.49 
* p-value from one-sided, two-sample bootstrap t-test with 10,000 replicates 
 
 The great majority of participants chose the utilitarian answer for dilemma D4, regardless 
of questionnaire type. Greater good dilemma D4 is conceived to allow for less personal 
involvement and emotional load, and for more deliberative control in moral judgments [12]. Thus, 
System 2 judgments are more likely to rule and it is not so surprising that respondents favored the 
utilitarian choice in dilemma D4. Most participants judged it right for an American executive to 
donate to a charity in a foreign country rather than one in his own country. The emotional distance 
was even greater for our sample of Brazilian respondents evaluating the moral attitude of an 
American individual. Utilitarians in dilemma D4 scored higher on the CRT in our sample (Table 
4 and Figure 2), though this difference was not statistically significant (Table 4). However, the 
role System 2 played in this decision can be evaluated by considering the perceived wrongness of 
not making the utilitarian choice. Not giving the utilitarian answer was more heavily perceived as 
wrong for this dilemma D4 (statistically significant for type 1 questionnaires).  
 Most respondents rejected the utilitarian choice in greater good dilemma D5 (either donate 
money or buy oneself a car; Figure 3), despite perceiving the wrongness of doing that (statistically 
significant for type 1 questionnaires). Again, being utilitarian is cognitively too demanding due to 
the self-interest component of D5 [12]. Judgments aimed at maximizing the greater good are thus 
weakened by considerations of self-interest. However, self-interest is supposed to be out of place 
if one were genuinely aiming to promote the greater good from an impartial utilitarian standpoint 
[12]. The results on the CRT even show the choice of maximizing self-interest over maximizing 
the greater good is thoughtful, in that non-utilitarians for this dilemma D5 scored higher on the 
test (statistically significant for type 1 questionnaires). 
 Data from an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) study provide evidence for 
the conflicting roles System 1 and System 2 play in utilitarian moral judgments [22]. The 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex are brain regions associated with 
cognitive control, and therefore with the role System 2 plays. Such areas are recruited to resolve 
moral dilemmas in which a utilitarian judgement has to overcome a personal, automatic judgment. 
When System 1 rules in personal judgments, there is increase in amygdala activity. This 
neuroscientific evidence matches our experimental evidence that utilitarian judgments are 




This study experimentally evaluated utilitarian judgments under the dual-system approach. 
Participants responded to a cognitive reflection test as well as to sacrificial and greater good 
dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. We considered 
utilitarian moral dilemmas that purposely contrast circumstantial or parochial dilemmas with 
humanity dilemmas. While personal dilemmas are associated with egocentric attitudes, greater 
good dilemmas consider the whole of humanity. 
Performance on the cognitive reflection test improved when participants responded to 
questionnaires that posted the moral dilemmas at the beginning. This possibly has occurred 
because participants became more cognitively alert after answering the questions related to the 
dilemmas. 
The different dilemmas D1-D5 are not cognitively similar. Non-utilitarians beat utilitarians 
on CRT performance in dilemmas D1 and D5, but the reverse is true considering dilemmas D2, 
D3 and D4. 
Most respondents were non-utilitarians when the sacrificial moral dilemma D1 was framed 
as pushing a person, but they reverted their judgment and became utilitarians when the dilemma 
was framed as moving an object. This moral judgment reversal replicated previous findings in 
literature [18]. 
Respondents found it more wrong not to make the utilitarian choice in D1. When they 
deliberately thought (using System 2), they were capable of making the utilitarian arithmetic, 
though this does not mean participants were automatic non-utilitarians. The default, automatic 
decision using System 1 was frame dependent. This is compatible with the view that people do not 
carry any predetermined moral preferences. Moral intuitions are about descriptions, not about 
substance. 
Respondents also found it more wrong not to make the utilitarian choice of killing a man 
in the self-benefit dilemma D2. However, their moral judgment was also frame dependent. Being 
utilitarian was costly in cognitive currency. Performing the utilitarian arithmetic required the use 
of System 2, and participants made the utilitarian judgment in D2 because System 2 was at work 
as the arithmetic involved protecting oneself. However, under ego depletion, System 1 ruled and 
participants reverted their moral judgments and became non-utilitarians. After all, for System 1 
killing is bad and WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is). 
Most participants were not utilitarians when facing the greater good dilemma D3. Most 
respondents were not prepared to save a peace negotiator rather than one’s mother. They did not 
identify themselves with humanity as a whole, and preferred to make a judgment based on genetic 
ties. Being utilitarian by using System 2 in this dilemma D3 was considered by the participants of 
the experiment as highly costly in terms of cognitive currency. 
Not choosing the utilitarian answer was perceived as much more wrong for the greater 
good dilemma D4. This was not so surprising because the design of the dilemma makes room for 
System 2 to take control. D4 allows for less personal involvement and emotional load and for more 
deliberative control in moral judgments. For this reason, most participants judged it right for an 
American executive to donate to a charity in a foreign country rather than to one in his own 
country. 
Most respondents facing the dilemma to either donate money or buy oneself a car, made 
the non-utilitarian choice despite perceiving the wrongness of doing that. As before, being 
utilitarian here was cognitively too demanding and self-interest prevailed over the greater good. 
Taken as a whole, all the utilitarian dilemmas showed the utilitarian judgment was too 
demanding in terms of cognitive currency. And the moral intuitions related to System 1 were 
sometimes non-utilitarian or utilitarian, depending on how a dilemma was framed. Automatic 
moral judgments are about descriptions, not about substance. 
There is fMRI neuroscientific evidence for our experimental results [22]. Judgments in 
moral utilitarian dilemmas are mediated by a tension between System 1 and System 2. Being 
utilitarian by using System 2 is too demanding because the brain areas associated with cognitive 
control (the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex) increase activity. In 
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